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Abstract
Abstract. Policy-makers frequently face 
substantial uncertainties and are required 
to cope with alternative scenarios that 
depict possible future developments. This 
paper argues that scenario reasoning is 
prone to suffer from characteristic mistakes. 
Probabilistic fallacies quantify uncertainties 
in an illegitimate way. Possibilistic fallacies 
systematically underestimate the full range 
of uncertainty, neglect relevant possibilities 
or attempt to represent a space of possibi-
lities in an oversimplified way.  
Decision-theoretic fallacies, finally, fail to 
take the full range of uncertainties into 
account when justifying decisions, or misin-
terpret possibility statements by assigning 
them a special decision-theoretic meaning.
Keywords. scenario; possibility; great 
uncertainty; decision-making; fallacy
A slightly modified, German version of this 
text will appear in Christian Dieckhoff, Anna 
Leuschner und Frederike Neuber (Hg.): Die 
Energiewende und ihre Modelle. Was uns 
Energieszenarien sagen können – und was 
nicht. Bielefeld: transcript 2016.
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Most policy decisions have to be made in face of uncertainties about the options‘ outcomes. Standard 
expected utility models may be relevant and interesting from a theoretical point of view – yet the 
predictive uncertainties and the normative value of possible outcomes can rarely be quantified in a 
reliable way, which severely restricts the legitimate use of expected utility theory in scientific policy ad-
vice (Sahlin 2012). In response to this diagnosis, scholars from economics, decision theory, psychology 
and philosophy have investigated procedures of rational decision making that can cope with „deep,“ 
unquantifiable predictive or normative uncertainties; Hansson and Hadorn (2016a) comprehensively 
characterize such situations, subsuming them under the notion of „great uncertainty.“
A major feature of decision making under great uncertainty is that it copes with scenarios (or „projec-
tions“). Scenarios, according to this paper‘s terminology, depict future developments which are conside-
red to be possible. Arguing with possibilities in the context of decision making poses various problems. 
The pitfalls of scenario reasoning will be identified and discussed in this paper. It is supposed to show 
how one must not reason in situations of great uncertainty. Clearly, such negative advice is of limited 
help unless it is complemented by positive instructions on how one should reason. But the constructive 
task goes beyond the scope of this text – I will merely highlight Bradley and Steele (2015) and the rele-
vant chapters of The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis (namely Hansson 2016; Brun and Betz 2016; 
Betz 2016), which in turn refer to further literature.
Scenario reasoning in decision making contexts can be divided into two categories: (i) argumentation 
in favour of predictive statements („x, y and z are possible outcomes of that policy option“, „the set X 
contains all possible outcomes of that option“, „outcome x is more plausible than outcome y“); (ii) argu-
mentation, based on scenarios, in favour of prescriptive conclusions, which state that some course of ac-
tion is permissible or obligatory. Both sorts of reasoning have their own ‚logic‘ and hence go along with 
specific pitfalls. Section 3 and 4, re (i), discuss the potential mistakes in predictive argumentation while 
Section 5, re (ii), investigates common errors in practical argumentation. With a clear focus on scenarios, 
our discussion supplements and elaborates Hansson‘s broader analysis of fallacious reasoning under 
great uncertainty (Hansson 2016). Before we scrutinize reasoning errors that involve scenarios, however, 
we shall have a closer look at the notion of a fallacy in the following section.
1 Introduction
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In a very general sense, one commits a fallacy whenever one makes a mistake in reasoning. We use 
the notion of a fallacy, however, to refer more specifically to errors in drawing inferences. An argument 
is fallacious if and only if it is intended to be, but in fact is not valid, i.e. its premisses don‘t entail its 
conclusion.
(Example 1) The following argument is fallacious.
1. Socrates committed suicide only if he wasn’t murdered.
2. He wasn’t murdered.
3. Thus: Socrates committed suicide.
Its conclusion doesn‘t follow from the premisses.  
(Although both conclusion and premisses are true.) 
Many arguments which are wrongly assumed to be valid realize characteristic patterns. That allows us 
to categorize fallacious arguments (tokens) by means of argument schemes, or fallacies (types).
(Example 1, cont‘d) The argument realizes the following pattern,  
where p and q represent sentences. 
1. p only if q
2. q
3. Thus: p
This scheme is called „affirming the consequent.“
So fallacies represent argument schemes that are not correct (which means that it is not the case that 
every instantiation of that scheme is a valid argument). Caveat: An instantiation of a fallacy may howe-
ver represent a valid argument, because one and the same argument can conform to various patterns 
in the same time.
(Example 1, cont‘d) An argument which realizes the following pattern, 
where p and r represent sentences, instantiates „affirming the consequent.“
1. p only if (non-r and (r or p))
2. (non-r and (r or p))
3 Thus: p
But it is valid nonetheless, because the conclusion follows deductively from (2).
2 A Note on Fallacies
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To say that an argument with conclusion C is fallacious does not imply any of the following:
• The conclusion C of the argument is false.
• One of its premisses is false.
• There is no valid argument which comprises, besides further assumptions, 
 the premisses of the fallacious argument and successfully backs its conclusion C.
As the last point indicates, fallacious arguments can typically be repaired by modifying premisses or by 
introducing additional premisses. Whether the modified argument is sound, however, hinges on these 
novel premisses. The fact that an argument cannot be reconstructed without adding implausible additi-
onal premisses indicates that the argument is fallacious.
(Example 1, cont‘d) The original, fallacious argument can be repaired by modifying premiss (1).
1. Socrates committed suicide if and only if he wasn’t murdered. (Equivalently: Either Socrates was 
murdered or he committed suicide.)
2. He wasn’t murdered.
3. Thus: Socrates committed suicide.
The modified argument is valid, but premiss (1) has been significantly strengthened (being now 
an empirical statement) and it depends on the context whether it can be reasonably maintained.
In the remainder of this paper, we will present, albeit in an informal way, types of fallacies that are 
frequently committed in the context of scenario reasoning and illustrate them with concrete examples 
(i.e. fallacious arguments).
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The probabilistic fallacies I discuss represent special cases of Hansson‘s Tuxedo fallacy (Hansson 2009), 
that is the mistake to proceed as if reliable probability estimates were always available.
3.1 Frequency Fallacy
Scientific assessments which make use of multiple models play an increasingly important role in scena-
rio analysis. But it is fallacious to infer probability forecasts from multi-model ensembles (such as 
ensembles of climate models, or of energy models) by interpreting (weighted) relative frequencies of 
model results as probabilities.
Why is it fallacious? The argument assumes that (a priori) all models can be treated as equally likely 
(principle of indifference). But the principle of indifference is unjustified (van Fraassen 1989, chap. 12). In 
addition, the argument wrongly presumes that the models in the ensemble either span the whole range 
of possibilities or that the ensemble represents a random sample, drawn from the space of possible 
models. Both assumptions are also unwarranted (see also Knutti et al. 2010; Parker 2010). (If the argu-
ment is reconstructed in Bayesian terms, these two issues correspond to the problem of the prior and 
the problem of assessing the catch-all hypothesis, respectively.)
(Example 2) In a meta-study, Krey and Clarke (2011) investigate 162 global energy scenarios in or-
der to estimate the mitigation potential and costs of renewable energies. Instead of considered the 
162 scenarios as mere possibilities, the authors infer, from the scenario ensemble, a probabilistic 
conclusion and commit the frequency fallacy:
„Hence, although there is no obvious silver bullet, there is an indication that some renewable ener-
gy sources are more likely to play an important role than others.“ (p. 15; my emphasis)
The IPCC however, in its methodologically percipient Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation, makes use of Krey and Clarke‘s 162 scenarios in a cautious way 
and without committing the frequency fallacy (Fischedick et al. 2011).
3.2 Guru Fallacy
It is common practice to quantify uncertainties by means of so-called expert elicitations (O’Hagan and 
Oakley 2004). But it is fallacious to infer probability statements from alleged expert judgements in the 
absence of warrants for case-specific expert proficiency.
Why is it fallacious? Subjective degrees of belief, which are elicited, are not (necessarily) empirically 
constrained. Even worse, expert degrees of belief frequently don’t satisfy probability axioms and are 
hence incoherent in a Bayesian sense (see Baron 2008, 137–160). In short, the argument treats experts 
as gurus and not as fallible beings with limited – potentially no – knowledge of a specific issue; it ignores 
that, facing a peculiar question, even our best experts might have no clue.
3 Probabilistic Fallacies in Scenario Reasoning
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(Example 3) Expert elicitations have been used in climate science in order to probabilistically 
predict future climate change, in particular to estimate climate sensitivity (i.e., global equilibrium 
warming in response to a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 concentration), a potential future shut-
down of the thermohaline circulation (i.e., the global system of ocean currents, which transports 
in particular vast amounts of warm water into the North Atlantic), and the contribution of polar 
ice sheets to sea level rise (cf. Morgan and Keith 1995; Zickfeld et al. 2007; Bamber and Aspinall 
2013 respectively). These studies, however, don‘t show that the scientists who are questioned really 
possess a sufficiently broad range of experience in order to estimate the probabilities in question 
in a reliable and correct way. That‘s why they commit the guru fallacy. In fact, one of the studies 
finds that the experts‘ degrees of belief are not even coherent (Zickfeld et al. 2007).
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4 Possibilistic Fallacies in Scenario Reasoning
4.1 One Baseline Fallacy
In policy analysis, the consequences of policy options are typically compared to a reference („business 
as usual“, or baseline) scenario. Now, under great uncertainty, it is fallacious to assess policy options 
with respect to a single reference scenario only.
Why is it fallacious? Under uncertainty, not only specific policy outcomes but the future development 
that results if no policy is implemented is uncertain, too. By considering only one baseline scenario, one 
ignores this uncertainty and effectively pretends to be able to make accurate deterministic forecasts. 
(Note however that this sort of argumentation ceases to be fallacious as soon as one explicitly assumes, 
and has even reason to assume, that the consequences of „business as usual“ policy can be predicted 
with certainty. Relying on a single baseline scenario is, in this particular case, legitimate.)1
(Example 4) Before the German federal government eventually decided to opt out of nuclear ener-
gy after the Fukushima accident, it adopted, in 2010, a national energy plan („Energiekonzept“) 
which foresaw to prolong the operation of existing nuclear power plants. As part of the preparati-
on of this policy proposal, three leading research institutes were commissioned to compile an as-
sessment report, which investigates alternative options for extending the lifetime of nuclear power 
plants in view of macroeconomic effects and climate policy targets (Prognos, EWI, and GWS 2010). 
Yet the study compares the alternative policies in view of a single reference scenario only, which 
implicitly assumes that the effects of not extending the lifespan can be precisely and accurately 
predicted. The authors hence commit the one baseline fallacy.
4.2 Ceteris Paribus Fallacy
The one baseline fallacy can be avoided by interpreting scenario studies which rely on a single refe-
rence scenario along the following lines: These studies arguably don‘t deliver a full range of possibilities, 
but since the policy scenarios only differ from the reference scenario in view of implementing a certain 
policy measure, such studies determine at least relative effects (tendencies) of policies, which allow one 
to compare policies ceteris paribus, i.e. as long as everything else is kept constant. However, it is falla-
cious to infer from the qualitative or quantitative differences between the policy scenarios on the one 
side and the reference scenario on the other side a supposedly stable causal effect of the policy options, 
which will ensue independently of whether the reference scenario actually holds or not. 
Why is it fallacious? The argument assumes that the causal effect of a policy is independent of the 
reference scenario. But that is of course an unwarranted assumption. Even the trends (in variables of 
interest) a policy gives rise to will in general depend on the circumstances under which the policy is 
implemented. So scientific assessments with one baseline scenario don‘t even reliably identify the di-
rections of the changes policies will give rise to (see also Betz 2006, 113–116).
1 I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.
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(Example 5) Dieckhoff (2015, 160–163) shows that it is common for energy system modelers to 
interpret the differences between policy scenarios on the one side and the baseline scenario on 
the other side as robust qualitative effects of the policies under consideration. This interpretation 
avoids the one baseline fallacy, but it suffers from the ceteris paribus fallacy.
4.3 Reduction to Extremes Fallacy
Scientific reports which assess policy options under great uncertainty frequently only consider a handful 
of (extreme) scenarios which are supposed to represent the range of possibilities. But, as Voigt (2016) 
explains in detail, it is fallacious to infer properties of the entire space of possibilities from a few extreme 
scenarios only (instead of systematically sampling the space of possibilities).
Why is it fallacious? In general, a multidimensional (as opposed to a one-dimensional) space of possi-
bilities can’t be ‚spanned‘ by a handful of scenarios. A topologically complex set cannot be reduced to 
its extremes. Besides, extreme input scenarios (for exogenous variables) don’t necessarily correspond 
to extreme output scenarios (concerning endogenous variables).
(Example 6) The federal regulatory agency which supervises the expansion of the German electri-
city grid (the „Bundesnetzagentur“) stipulates that the planning should be based on four scenarios 
only, including two extreme ones, which are supposed to cover the whole bandwidth of probable 
energy-economic developments (Bundesnetzagentur 2012). The planners hence commit the re-
duction to extremes fallacy. If, for example, a policy option turns out to yield acceptable outcomes 
under all four scenarios considered by the Bundesnetzagentur, that does not guarantee that its 
effects are acceptable under any possible future development.
4.4 Verificationist Fallacy
It is fallacious to infer from a range of scenarios which have positively been established as possible 
(which means that they are shown to be consistent with current scientific understanding) that scenarios 
outside that range are impossible (and hence irrelevant). Taleb (2010, 93) describes a version of this 
fallacy, namely the conflation of a situation where there is no evidence for the possibility of P with a 
situation where there is evidence against the possibility of P („mistaking absence of evidence (of harm) 
for evidence of absence“), as „the mother of all harmful mistakes.“ (See also Shue 2010)
Why is it fallacious? Possibility statements don’t imply that some hypothetical development is incon-
sistent with what we know, but only the latter would demonstrate that the respective development is 
actually impossible. The argument seems to rely on a false dualistic assumption: what is not shown to 
be possible is impossible (cf. Betz 2010).
(Example 7) In its third assessment report, the IPCC has determined the range of possible future 
sea level rise exclusively on the basis of climate model simulations (IPCC 2001). As a consequence, 
only the verified possibilities have been communicated and the so-called non-falsified possibilities, 
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i.e. those for which we currently lack evidence, have been ignored. This instance of a verificationist 
fallacy is especially striking as it was clear that the climate models used to generate the range of 
scenarios didn‘t represent a key causal mechanism (notably the melting of polar ice sheets), which 
meant that the uncertainties were systematically underestimated (Betz 2009). The methodological 
mistakes have been uncovered in the ensuing scientific debate (Schubert et al. 2006; Rahmstorf 
2007; Stainforth et al. 2007) and the IPCC now mentions robust upper bounds of sea level rise in 
addition to model projections (Church et al. 2013).
4.5 Ignoring Surprise Fallacy
It is fallacious to infer that some state-of-affairs S is impossible from the mere fact that every articulated 
hypothesis according to which the state-of-affairs S pertains has been successfully refuted.
Why is it fallacious? The argument would be fine if it could be safely assumed that we have actually 
considered all possible hypotheses. But that need not be the case, there could be so-far-unarticulated 
hypotheses (unknown unknowns) and some of these might be consistent with the state-of-affairs S! The 
fact that we haven‘t thought about some scenario doesn‘t mean that it is impossible.
(Example 8) During the planning and construction of CERN‘s Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in Ge-
neva, the hypothesis that the LHC generates stable microphysical black holes which eventually 
accrete the Earth has been seriously discussed (Blaizot et al. 2003; Clery and Cho 2008). The LHC 
Safety Assessment Group argued against the possibility of this state of affairs by claiming that the-
re is no consistent microphysical scenario in which microscopic black holes are stable and accrete 
matter (Ellis et al. 2008). The LHC is presumably safe. Yet at closer inspection, the argument turns 
out to be fallacious: maybe a microphysical scenario which allows for stable, matter-accreting 
black holes has simply not been articulated so far.
4.6 Trusting the Model Blindly Fallacy
Scenarios are frequently established by means of simulations, based on a sophisticated model (e.g. a 
climate model or a model of the energy system). But it is fallacious to infer that some future develop-
ment is possible merely because it has been obtained as a model result.
Why is it fallacious? Only if the model itself plus the parameter values, the boundary conditions and 
the initial conditions, which are used to derive the scenario, are collectively consistent with current sci-
entific understanding (background knowledge) – only if this holds does the simulation establish that its 
results are consistent with background knowledge, too. Given the plethora of idealizing and unrealistic 
assumptions built into scientific models, that necessary condition seems rather implausible (Betz 2010).
(Example 9) This fallacy is abundant in scenario reasoning and scientific policy advice under 
great uncertainty. It seems that neither climate, nor energy system nor macroeconomic models 
are suited to establish possible consequences (scenarios) of alternative policy options (pace, e.g., 
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IPCC 2011; Collins et al. 2013; European Commission 2011). That‘s because all these models make 
use of unrealistic assumptions which are known to be wrong (e.g. Pahle et al. 2012). (And in addi-
tion, these unrealistic assumptions cannot be justified as means to make the models predictively 
successful.)
This fallacy appears to be devastating for state-of-the-art, model-based scenario analysis. It raises the 
question whether complex simulation models have a role to play in scenario reasoning at all (cf. Grüne-
Yanoff 2014; Betz 2015 ).
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5.1 Picking the Scenario Fallacy
In decisions under great uncertainty, policy-makers typically face a huge variety of possibilities which 
may be difficult to absorb. Hence a desire to „reduce“ the uncertainty. Yet it is fallacious to make and 
to justify a decision by choosing a single outcomes-scenario from a possibility range and neglecting 
the others in the further decision-making process. This mistake is a special case of the „cherry picking 
fallacy“ (Hansson 2016).
Why is it fallacious? The underlying decision principle is – depending on how it is spelled out – empty 
or self-refuting. If the scenario range is only sufficiently diverse, any recommendation whatsoever – and 
hence even contrary conclusions – can be derived by focusing on a suitable scenario.
(Example 10) In 2015, the German Federal Government had appointed a cooperate auditor to ve-
rify whether the reserves accumulated by German energy providers will match the future costs of 
dismantling their nuclear power stations (cf. Weingartner 2015). The report issued by the auditor 
considered different scenarios in order to account for general uncertainties in future discount rates 
and so-called nuclear-specific construction costs. It found that the overall costs for dismantling the 
nuclear infrastructure will range from 29.9, to 77.4 billion Euro, while the energy providers‘ reser-
ves amount only to 38.3 billion Euro. Now, the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy 
interpreted the report as saying that energy providers have built up sufficient reserves to cover 
future costs. This interpretation obviously ignores the vast range of uncertainty, focuses on a sin-
gle (convenient) scenario and hence commits the picking the scenario fallacy.
5.2 Certainty Equivalence Fallacy
Decision-makers might also be tempted to „reduce“ uncertainty in view of the perceived plausibility of 
the various scenarios. But it is fallacious to justify a decision, or a recommendation, by pretending that 
the most plausible, or most likely outcomes-scenario from a possibility range will certainly come true. 
This type of reasoning is closely related to the fallacy of picking the scenario; it is also built into some 
macroeconomic growth models with the aim of making them mathematically tractable (Romer 1996, 
246–7).
Why is it fallacious? First of all, under great uncertainty, there is by definition no reliable probabilistic 
information against which a scenario could be singled out as the most likely one. Any choice of a scena-
rio is purely subjective and arbitrary. If, however, reliable probability forecasts were available, then the 
decision principle of certainty equivalence contradicts expected utility maximization; even worse, it is 
totally insensitive to known and quantified uncertainties and hence highly counter-intuitive.
(Example 11) The German Council of Economic Experts uses to provide single point forecasts of 
economic growth in its annual reports, although the advisory board is well aware of the huge 
uncertainties of such predictions (which the reports discuss in detail). But it defends the single point 
forecast explicitly as the most likely macroeconomic development (Sachverständigenrat zur Begut-
5 Decision-theoretic Fallacies in Scenario Reasoning
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achtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2014, 104). By suggesting that policy decisions 
under great uncertainty can be made in view of the most likely scenario only, the German Council 
of Economic Experts is thus committing, year after year, the fallacy of certainty equivalence.
5.3 Conflation of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Fallacy
A neat justification of policy measures consists in showing that these measures are required to attain 
some policy goals. But it is fallacious to infer that bringing about some feature (a policy measure) is 
required for reaching a policy goal from the fact that the feature (the policy measure) figures in all in-
vestigated scenarios in which the policy target is attained.
Why is it fallacious? The argument fails to consider that there might be further scenarios in which the 
policy goals are attained but in which the specific feature (policy measure) does not obtain. The under-
lying point is that there is no reason to assume that the scenarios set up so far exhaust the set of all 
possible future developments. The conflation of necessary and sufficient conditions in scenario reaso-
ning is hence closely related to the verificationist fallacy.
At best, the identification of scenarios in which policy goals are attained by certain measures shows that 
these measures are (possibly, given the right circumstances) sufficient to attain the goal.
(Example 12) Analysing Greenpeace‘s comprehensive energy [r]evolution scenario (Voigt 2014a) as 
well as the scientific assessment of energy policies which accompanied the European Commission‘s 
Energy Roadmap 2050 (Voigt 2014b), Voigt discovers that these studies (mis-)interpret the finding 
that all scenarios in which ambitious climate policy targets are attained exhibit a specific feature, 
say drastic reductions in energy demand, as saying that the specific feature is necessary in order 
to attain the policy goals in question. As Voigt notes, this is obviously mistaken because the studies 
don‘t pretend to provide a comprehensive assessment of all possible future developments. The 
authors hence commit the fallacy of conflating necessary and (possibly) sufficient conditions.
5.4 Possibility Means Feasibility Fallacy
Debates about alternative goals for policy-making must pay close attention to the question whether 
and at what costs these goals can be reached. Proponents of policy targets will argue that the goals are 
‚realistic‘ and try to establish the goals‘ achievability. Yet, it is fallacious to infer that it is feasible to reach 
a policy target on the basis that there is a scenario in which the target is attained.
Why is it fallacious? There is a fundamental difference between (i) x being possible (i.e., being consistent 
with current knowledge) and (ii) someone being able to bring about x. It‘s possible that the number of 
sun-like stars in our galaxy is even, but that‘s nothing anybody can bring about or achieve. 
On the linguistic surface, however, that difference get‘s frequently blurred, as we use words like „can“ or 
„possible“ to denote both what is possible and what is achievable („it‘s not possible for me to be there in 
time“, „the company can do better, it‘s possible to improve results“, „I can do that“, „it can be true that 
...“). Now, more specifically, the argument is fallacious because there might be further circumstances 
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(not considered in any scenario so far) which prevent decision-makers from reaching the policy target 
by means of any measure whatsoever. So, at best, the argument shows that it is possible that the policy 
goals will be achieved (but besides doing the right things this requires also luck).
(Example 13) In 2011, the WWF published a global energy scenario according to which the world 
economy switches to 100% renewables by the mid of the century (World Wide Fund for Nature 
2011). The scenario is supposed to establish that „switching to a fully renewable energy supply by 
2050 is achievable“ (p. 23) and that it is „possible to secure a fully renewable, sustainable energy 
supply for everyone on the planet by 2050.“ (p. 23) WWF „believes that it is a goal we can and must 
achieve.“ (p. 23) But the authors admit in the same time that the report only presents a scenario 
„which demonstrates that it is technically possible to achieve almost 100 per cent renewable energy 
sources within the next four decades.“ (p. 11; my emphasis) What are we to make of this? The report 
shows that decarbonisation of the global energy system is consistent with current knowledge, and 
feasible under many favourable assumptions. But that doesn‘t entail that policy-makers (or any 
other agents) are able to bring about these favourable assumptions. Admittedly, WWF concedes 
that „challenges“ lie ahead. Still, in presenting a mere possibility as something that can be achieved, 
WWF commits the possibility means feasibility fallacy (or is on the brink of doing so).
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This paper has argued that scenario reasoning is prone to suffer from various mistakes. Probabilistic 
fallacies quantify uncertainties in an illegitimate way. Possibilistic fallacies systematically underestimate 
the full range of uncertainty, neglect relevant possibilities or attempt to represent a space of possibilities 
in an oversimplified way. Decision-theoretic fallacies, finally, fail to take the full range of uncertainties 
into account when justifying decisions, or misinterpret possibility statements by giving them a special 
decision-theoretic meaning.
Implicitly, all these reasoning patterns have been diagnosed as fallacious on the background of a theory 
of correct possibilistic reasoning and decision-making under great uncertainty. Such a positive theory, 
as for example introduced in The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis (Hansson and Hadorn 2016b), 
certainly has to complement our negative account of reasoning errors in order to help decision-makers 
and stakeholders to improve the way they reason with scenarios.
6 Conclusion
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